Saturday 21 July 2018
Search - Content
Search SEO Glossary
PLG_SEARCH_JOOMBLOG
Contact Us

1787 - Richard Henry Lee to Governor Edmund Randolph -

Virginia Gazette (Petersburg), December 6, 1787


Copy of a letter from the Hon. Richard Henry Lee, Esq; one of the Delegates from this State in Congress, to his Excellency the Governor.

New-York, Oct. 16, 1787.

DEAR SIR, I was duly honored with your favor of September 17th, from Philadelphia, which should have been acknowledged long before now, if the nature of the business that it related to had not required time.

The establishment of the new plan of government, in its present form, is a question that involves such immense consequences to the present times and to posterity, that it calls for the deepest attention of the best and wisest friends of their country and of mankind. If it be found good after mature deliberation, adopt it, if wrong, amend it at all events, for to say (as many do) that a bad government must be established for fear of anarchy, is really saying that we must kill ourselves for fear of dying. Experience and the actual state of things, shew that there is no difficulty in procuring a general convention; the late one being collected without any obstruction: Nor does external war, or internal discord prevent the most cool, collected, full, and fair discussion of this all-important subject. If with infinite ease, a convention was obtained to prepare a system, why may not another with equal ease be procured to make proper and necessary amendments? Good government is not the work of a short time, or of sudden thought. From Moses to Montesquieu the greatest geniuses have been employed on this difficult subject, and yet experience has shewn capital defects in the system produced for the government of mankind. But since it is neither prudent or easy to make frequent changes in government, and as bad governments have been generally found the most fixed; so it becomes of the last consequence to frame the first establishment upon ground the most unexceptionable, and such as the best theories with experience justify; not trusting as our new constitution does, and as many approve of doing, to time and future events to correct errors, that both reason and experience in similar cases, point out in the new system. It has hitherto been supposed a fundamental maxim that in governments rightly balanced, the different branches of legislature should be unconnected, and that the legislative and executive powers should be separate:—In the new constitution, the president and senate have all the executive and two thirds of the legislative power. In some weighty instances (as making all kinds of treaties which are to be the laws of the land) they have the whole legislative and executive powers. They jointly, appoint all officers civil and military, and they (the senate) try all impeachments either of their own members, or of the officers appointed by themselves.

Is there not a most formidable combination of power thus created in a few, and can the most critic eye, if a candid one, discover responsibility in this potent corps? Or will any sensible man say, that great power without responsibility can be given to rulers with safety to liberty? It is most clear that the parade of impeachment is nothing to them or any of them—as little restraint is to be found, I presume from the fear of offending constituents.—The president is for four years duration and Virginia (for example) has one vote of thirteen in the choice of him, and this thirteenth vote not of the people, but electors, two removes from the people. The senate is a body of six years duration, and as in the choice of president, the largest state has but a thirteenth vote, so is it in the choice of senators.—This latter statement is adduced to shew that responsibility is as little to be apprehended from amenability to constituents, as from the terror of impeachment. You are, therefore, Sir, well warranted in saying, either a monarchy or aristocracy will be generated, perhaps the most grievous system of government may arise. It cannot be denied with truth, that this new constitution is, in its first principles, highly and dangerously oligarchic; and it is a point agreed that a government of the few, is, of all governments, the worst. The only check to be found in favor of the democratic principle in this system is, the house of representatives; which I believe may justly be called a mere shread or rag of representation: It being obvious to the least examination, that smallness of number and great comparative disparity of power, renders that house of little effect to promote good, or restrain bad government. But what is the power given to this ill constructed body? To judge of what may be for the general welfare, and such judgments when made, the acts of Congress become the supreme laws of the land. This seems a power co-extensive with every possible object of human legislation.—Yet there is no restraint in form of a bill of rights, to secure (what Doctor Blackstone calls) that residuum of human rights, which is not intended to be given up to society, and which indeed is not necessary to be given for any good social purpose.—The rights of conscience, the freedom of the press, and the trial by jury are at mercy. It is there stated, that in criminal cases, the trial shall be by jury. But how? In the state. What then becomes of the jury of the vicinage or at least from the county in the first instance, for the states being from 50 to 700 miles in extent? This mode of trial even in criminal cases may be greatly impaired, and in civil causes the inference is strong, that it may be altogether omitted as the constitution positively assumes it in criminal, and is silent about it in civil causes.—Nay, it is more strongly discountenanced in civil cases by giving the supreme court in appeals, jurisdiction both as to law and fact. Judge Blackstone in his learned commentaries, art. jury trial, says, it is the most transcendant privilege which any subject can enjoy or wish for, that he cannot be affected either in his property, his liberty, his person, but by the unanimous consent of 12 of his neighbours and equals. A constitution that I may venture to affirm has under providence, secured the just liberties of this nation for a long succession of ages.—The impartial administration of justice, which secures both our persons and our properties, is the great end of civil society. But if that be entirely entrusted to the magistracy, a select body of men, and those generally selected by the prince, or such as enjoy the highest offices of the state, these decisions in spite of their own natural integrity, will have frequently an involuntary bias towards those of their own rank and dignity. It is not to be expected from human nature, that the few should always be attentive to the good of the many. The learned judge further says, that every tribunal selected for the decision of facts, is a step towards establishing aristocracy; the most oppressive of all governments. The answer to these objections is, that the new legislature may provide remedies!—But as they may, so they may not, and if they did, a succeeding assembly may repeal the provisions.—The evil is found resting upon constitutional bottom, and the remedy upon the mutable ground of legislation, revocable at any annual meeting. It is the more unfortunate that this great security of human rights, the trial by jury, should be weakened in this system, as power is unnecessarily given in the second section of the third article, to call people from their own country in all cases of controversy about property between citizens of different states and foreigners, with citizens of the United States, to be tried in a distant court where the Congress may sit. For although inferior congressional courts may for the above purposes be instituted in the different states, yet this is a matter altogether in the pleasure of the new legislature, so that if they please not to institute them, or if they do not regulate the right of appeal reasonably, the people will be exposed to endless oppression, and the necessity of submitting in multitudes of cases, to pay unjust demands, rather than follow suitors, through great expence, to far distant tribunals, and to be determined upon there, as it may be, without a jury.—In this congressional legislature, a bare majority of votes can enact commercial laws, so that the representatives of the seven northern states, as they will have a majority, can by law create the most oppressive monopoly upon the five southern states, whose circumstances and productions are essentially different from theirs, although not a single man of these voters are the representatives of, or amenable to the people of the southern states. Can such a set of men be, with the least colour of truth called a representative of those they make laws for? It is supposed that the policy of the northern states will prevent such abuses. But how feeble, Sir, is policy when opposed to interest among trading people:—And what is the restraint arising from policy? Why that we may be forced by abuse to become ship-builders!—But how long will it be before a people of agriculture can produce ships sufficient to export such bulky commodities as ours, and of such extent; and if we had the ships, from whence are the seamen to come? 4000 of whom at least will be necessary in Virginia. In questions so liable to abuse, why was not the necessary vote put to two thirds of the members of the legislature? With the constitution, came from the convention so many members of that body to Congress, and of those too, who were among the most fiery zealots for their system, that the votes of three states being of them, two states divided by them, and many others mixed with them, it is easy to see that Congress could have little opinion upon the subject. Some denied our right to make amendments, whilst others more moderate agreed to the right, but denied the expediency of amending; but it was plain that a majority was ready to send it on in terms of approbation—my judgment and conscience forbid the last, and therefore I moved the amendments that I have the honor to send you inclosed herewith, and demanded the yeas and nays that they might appear on the journal. This seemed to alarm and to prevent such appearance on the journal, it was agreed to transmit the constitution without a syllable of approbation or disapprobation; so that the term unanimously only applied to the transmission, as you will observe by attending to the terms of the resolve for transmitting. Upon the whole, Sir, my opinion is, that as this constitution abounds with useful regulations, at the same time that it is liable to strong and fundamental objections, the plan for us to pursue, will be to propose the necessary amendments, and express our willingness to adopt it with the amendments, and to suggest the calling of a new convention for the purpose of considering them. To this I see no well founded objection, but great safety and much good to be the probable result. I am perfectly satisfied that you make such use of this letter as you shall think to be for the public good; and now after begging your pardon for so great a trespass on your patience, and presenting my best respects to your lady, I will conclude with assuring you, that I am with the sincerest esteem and regard, dear Sir, your most affectionate and obedient servant, RICHARD HENRY LEE.

POSTSCRIPT.

It having been found from universal experience, that the most express declarations and reservations are necessary to protect the just rights and liberty of mankind from the silent, powerful and ever active conspiracy of those who govern; and it appearing to be the sense of the good people of America, by the various bills or declarations of rights whereon the government of the greater number of states are founded. That such precautions are necessary to restrain and regulate the exercise of the great powers given to rulers. In conformity with these principles, and from respect for the public sentiment on this subject, it is submitted,—That the new constitution proposed for the government of the United States be bottomed upon a declaration or bill of rights, clearly and precisely stating the principles upon which this social compact is founded, to wit: That the rights of conscience in matters of religion ought not to be violated—That the freedom of the press shall be secured—That the trial by jury in criminal and civil cases, and the modes prescribed by the common law for the safety of life in criminal prosecutions, shall be held sacred—That standing armies in times of peace are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be permitted, unless assented to by two-thirds of the members composing each house of the legislature under the new constitution—That the elections should be free and frequent; That the right administration of justice should be secured by the independency of the judges; That excessive bail, excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishments, should not be demanded or inflicted; That the right of the people to assemble peaceably, for the purpose of petitioning the legislature, shall not be prevented; That the citizens shall not be exposed to unreasonable searches, seizure of their persons, houses, papers or property; and it is necessary for the good of society, that the administration of government be conducted with all possible maturity of judgment, for which reason it hath been the practice of civilized nations, and so determined by every state in the Union: That a council of state or privy council should be appointed to advise and assist in the arduous business assigned to the executive power. Therefore let the new constitution be so amended, as to admit the appointment of a privy council, to consist of eleven members chosen by the president, but responsible for the advice they may give. For which purpose the advice given shall be entered in a council book, and signed by the giver, in all affairs of great moment, and that the counsellors act under an oath of office. In order to prevent the dangerous blending of the legislative and executive powers, and to secure responsibility, the privy, and not the senate shall be joined with the president in the appointment of all officers, civil and military, under the new constitution; that the constitution be so altered as not to admit the creation of a vice-president, when duties as assigned may be discharged by the privy council, except in the instance of proceeding in the senate, which may be supplied by a speaker chosen from the body of senators by themselves, as usual, that so may be avoided the establishment of a great officer of state, who is sometimes to be joined with the legislature, and sometimes to administer the government, rendering responsibility difficult, besides giving unjust and needless preeminence to that state from whence this officer may have come. That such parts of the new constitution be amended as provide imperfectly for the trial of criminals by a jury of the vicinage, and to supply the omission of a jury trial in civil causes or disputes about property between individuals, whereby the common law is directed, and as generally it is secured by the several state constitutions. That such parts of the new constitution be amended, as permit the vexatious and oppressive callings of citizens from their own country, and all controversies between citizens of different states and between citizens and foreigners, to be tried in a far distant court, and as it may be without a jury, whereby in a multitude of cases, the circumstances of distance and expence may compel numbers to submit to the most unjust and ill-founded demand— That in order to secure the rights of the people more effectually from violation, the power and respectability of the house of representatives be increased, by increasing the number of delegates to that house, where the popular interest must chiefly depend for protection—That the constitution be so amended as to increase the number of votes necessary to determine questions in cases where a bare majority may be seduced by strong motives of interest to injure and oppress the minority of the community, as in commercial regulations, where advantage may be taken of circumstances to ordain rigid and premature laws, that will in effect amount to monopolies, to the great impoverishment of those states whose peculiar situation expose them to such injuries.